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Litigation,	11	DUKE	LAW	&	TECH.	REV.	357,	358	(2012)	(“Any	discussion	of	flaws	in	the	United	States	patent	system	inevitably	turns	to	the	system’s	modern	villain:	non-practicing	entities.”);	Lee,	19	STAN.	TECH.	L.	REV.	at	103	(“In	the	extreme,	such	prejudice	leads	to	a	moral	panic	in	which	rational	policymaking	and	decision-making give way to hysteria to fight the proverbial ‘folk devil’ (substitute: patent troll).”) 
(citing STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972)). 
3 See http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works (accessed Dec. 2016). 
4 Cf. JOHN LINDLOW, TROLLS: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 131 (Reaktion Books, 2014) 
(“Probably the most famous troll is the one under the bridge in The Three Billy Goats 
Gruff.”).  In the Norwegian fable, three billy goats cross a bridge in search of food.  
Under the bridge lives a troll who threatens to eat each billy goat.  The first two billy 





following behind.  But the third billy goat is so large that it defeats the troll, thus 
permanently solving the troll problem, as the LOT purports to do.  See id. at 69-70.         
5 http://lotnet.com (accessed Dec. 2016). 
6 See Part II(E), infra. 
7 See LOT agreement, v2_0-11_24_15, at § 2.3, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, available at 




8 See PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979) (“It has 
long been held by federal courts that agreements granting patent licenses are personal and 
not assignable unless expressly made so.”); Troy Iron & Nail v. Corning, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 193, 14 L. Ed. 383 (1852) (“A mere license to a party, without having his assigns 
or equivalents words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the 
grant of personal power to the licensees, and is not transferable by him to another.”). 
9 Cf. Reuben v. U.S. Air, No. 11-1235, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84038, *19 (W.D. Pa. 
June 18, 2012) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a breach of 
contract unless one is a party to that contract.”); Electron Energy Corp. v. Short, 408 Pa. 
Super. 563, 571 (1991) (“It is fundamental contract law that one cannot be liable for a 
breach of contract unless one is a party to the contract.”); Smartran, Inc. v. Alpine 
Connections, Inc., 352 Fed. Appx. 650, 656 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
10 See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether 
express or implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state 
contract law.’”) (quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., 871 F.2d 1082, 
1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Christopher M. Newman, A License is not a “Contract not to 
Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L.




11 See Part I(A), infra; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal 
property”). 
 
12 See Part I(C), infra. 
 
13 See, e.g., Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 244 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 
2001) (“[The holding that] an assignee can acquire rights no greater than those held by 
the assignor is consistent with the basic principle of commercial law encapsulated in the 
Latin phrase nemo dat qui non habet. . . .  The basic concept behind nemo dat is that a 










14 Cf. Lawrence Berger, Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 
MINN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1970) (“It was early apparent that unless agreements (contained 
in deeds or leases) respecting the use of land were binding not only upon the promisor 
(covenantor) who entered into them but also upon purchasers from him, such 
undertakings would be worthless, since otherwise they could be avoided by a mere 
transfer to a third party.”); Jay Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, 
Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L. J. 231, 304 (2014) (“if a 
patentee could extinguish the benefits of a FRAND commitment by transferring the 
patent to a third party, this would lead to inequitable results”). 
 
15 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, LLC v. Panasonic Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 
(N.D. Cal. July 2, 2013). 
 
16 Jones v. Berger, 58 F. 1006, 1007 (C.C.D. Md. 1893); see also, Innovus Prime, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *16 (“This occurs whether or not an assignee had notice.”); V-
Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Colo. Mar. 
10, 2006) (“The court does not agree that the doctrine of ‘bona fide purchaser’ as urged 
by V-Formation precludes Benetton from asserting the covenant not to sue as a defense in 
this case.”).  Of course, a true “bona fide purchaser” patent assignee may have some 
claim against a patent assignor / seller who is less than forthright about the extent to 
which the patent has been license. 
 
17 See Menachem Mautner, The Eternal Triangles of The Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 116 
(1991) (“Clearly, whenever the purchaser acts with actual knowledge or presumed 
suspicion of the existence of a prior conflicting claim, the purchaser is the party best 
located to prevent the conflict by avoiding the transaction.”).  In the case of licenses, the 
purchaser would not necessarily avoid the transaction, but might just pay a lower price 






18 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving 
the actual use of the patent ‘run with the patent’ and are binding on subsequent owners”) 
(citing Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 
19 See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
THE LAND” (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207. 
 
20 35 U.S.C. § 261; see also, Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. 
App. 14th 1996) (“Since a patent is to be treated as personal property, there can be no 
covenants that ‘run with’ the patent.”); In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 
2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Patents are personal property.  Real property concepts (such 





21 See, e.g., Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 
1983) (explaining that it is a “principle of patent law . . . that the purchaser does not 
acquire any rights greater than those possessed by the owner of the patent”) (citing 
Featherstone v. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 F. 110, 111 (C.C.N.Y. 1892)).  
 
22 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721, 741 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (“It has long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights 
in a particular thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an 
invention – are viewed as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred 
separately.”); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-36 (1990); Thomas C. 
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 
23 See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“[B]ecause the owner of a patent cannot transfer an interest greater than that 
which it possesses, an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal encumbrances 
thereon.”); Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15; Paice LLC v. Hyundai 
Motor Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *28 (D. Md. July 7, 2014) (“a patent owner 
cannot transfer an interest greater than that which it possesses, and assignees take patent 






24 See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 286 (“When a patent owner grants a license 
to another party, the license is often analyzed as a contract.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts . . . .”); 
H. Justin Pace, Note, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group 
Mergers: The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 263, 267 
(2010) (“Copyright and patent licenses are contracts and as such are interpreted according 
to state law.”); Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in 
Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012) (“This Article argues that 
the weight of judicial authority and sound policy support a contractual approach to 
license formation.”). 
 
25 See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Wi-LAN USA, Inc., No. 14-21854-CV-DMM, D.I. 165, *10 
(S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 2015) (“Ericsson does not have standing to maintain its claim for 
breach of contract.”). 
 
26 See, e.g., Innovus Prime, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93820, *15 (“agreements involving 




(citing Datatreasury, 522 F.3d 1372); Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33 
(“licensing terms not tied to the right to use a patented invention do not encumber”). 
 
27 See Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222 (“the burden of a covenant to pay rent runs with 
the land to the assignee of the tenant and the benefit runs to the successor in ownership of 
the landlord’s reversion”). 
 
28 Cf. In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *8 (“a royalty interest in a 






29 Cf. Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 234 (“The rules of law about covenants running with 
the land are so complex that only a very few specialists understand them.  Sometimes 
complexity in the law is necessary.  In this particular case, it is not.”). 
 
30 Where royalties are concerned, the relevant analysis is between the patent transferor 
and transferee, assuming that the licensee will be paying the same amount either way.  
The question is just, as a default rule, who will the licensee be paying.  If the royalties do 
not run, the transferor continues to get paid.  If the royalties do run, the payments go to 
the patent transferee (the new owner) instead.   
 
31 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1, 8 (1960) (“the ultimate 
result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if 
the pricing system is assumed to work without cost”); Guido Calabresi & Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (“Recently it has been argued that on certain 
assumptions, usually termed the absence of transaction costs, Pareto optimality or 
economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement.”). 
  
32 Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“markets require contracting or exchange, and 







33 ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (3d. ed. 2000). 
 
34 Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
773, 795 (2001) (“The disadvantages of the exclusion strategy are largely a function of 
the limitations on such rights imposed by the need to minimize the unit costs of 
processing information.  In order to keep these costs low, it is simply not possible to 






35 Id. at 850. 
 
36 See id. at 849 (“Each of the four institutions we have examined involves some 
combination of in personam and in rem relations.”).  
 
37 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). 
 
38 Pierre Schlag, How To Do Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187 
(2015) (“One of the most striking aspects of Hohfeld’s work is how much its architecture 





on the Work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/yale-
law-school-events/symposium-work-wesley-newcomb-hohfeld (Oct. 15, 2016).  
 
39 See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
729 (1996) (“Hohfeld’s contribution to the bundle of rights picture is quite 
understandable, since in a significant sense, he devised it, although he did not fully 
elaborate its contours.”); Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783 (explaining that 
Hohfeld’s work “directly anticipates the adoption of the bundle-of-rights metaphor 
favored by the Legal Realists”). 
 
40 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L. J. 66, 
92 n.49 (1917) (explaining that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” “is rapidly shifted 
about by lawyers and courts, -- usually even by the more careful writers, -- so as to cover 
not only more complex groups of operative facts, but also the jurial relations flowing 
either from a ‘mere permission’ or from more complex sets of facts”); see also Hohfeld, 
23 YALE L. J. at 24-25 (“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar 
inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate 
between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called ‘agreements’ of the 
parties, and the legal ‘contractual obligation’ to which those facts give rise.”). 
 
41 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 22 (“At the very outset it seems necessary to emphasize the 
importance of differentiating purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts 
that call such relations into being.”); see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 
192 (“Consider the term ‘contract.’  Sometimes it refers to the mental agreement reached 
by the parties (e.g., the mental state); at other times to the physical embodiment of that 
agreement, (e.g., the document); and, at other times, to the various rights, duties, and 







42 See, e.g., 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[1] (2008) (“a patent 
grants to the patentee and his assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and 
selling the invention”); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“a patent grants only the right to exclude others and confers no right on 
its holder to make, use, or sell”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1806 (2007) (“Although it 
is sometimes overlooked, patent law is explicitly based on exclusion rather than on rights 
to use . . . .”). 
 
43 See Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s right that Y shall not enter on 
the land is Y’s duty not to enter”). 
 
44 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30 (“The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui 
generis; and thus attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether 
useless.”).  
 
45 See Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 189 (“Hohfeld’s work might best be read 
as a contribution about how to think, not what to think.”).   
 
46 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 21.  







48 Id. at 21-22. 
 
49 See Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 757 
(1921) (“Here courts tend inveterately to confuse acts and the legal relations which result 
therefrom and the battle begun over words terminates in a result shaped by those 
words.”).  
 
50 Indeed Hohfeld stated that the “chameleon-hued term, ‘license,’” is “rapidly shifted 
about by lawyers and courts,” and but did not go much further in this regard because 
“dealing at all adequately with the intricate and confused subject, would, in and of itself, 
require a long article.” Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License 





51 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 25; see also, Schlag, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 192. 
 
52 Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 760-61 (“The use of 
the one term ‘license’ to describe a privilege accompanied by an immunity from 
revocation and a privilege not so accompanied creates an illusion of certainty and an 
erroneous belief in identity.”).  
 
53 Newman, 98 IOWA L. REV. at 1129. 
 





55 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 32 (“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the 
former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay 
off the place”).  
 
56 Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“It is not so much that rights ‘imply’ or ‘give 
rise’ to duties.  Rather, one’s rights are duties in someone else just as one’s duties are 
rights in someone else.  As Karl Llewellyn observed, rights and duties are simply 
different ways of talking about the same legal relation.”).  
 
57 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 33 (“the correlative of X’s privilege of entering himself is 
manifestly Y’s ‘no-right’ that X shall not enter”).  
 





59 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55.  
 
60 Schlag, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 201 (“This gets us to the crux of the matter with 
regard to the difference between rights and privileges.  The former establishes the 
predicate for a legal remedy, namely a duty in B.”). 
 
61 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 30.   
 
62 Hohfeld, 23 YALE L. J. at 55 (“a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity 





63 Id. at 55.  
 
64 Id. at 49. 
 
65 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In its 
simplest form, a license means only leave to do a thing which the licensor would 
otherwise have a right to prevent.  Such a license grants to the licensee merely a privilege 
that protects him from a claim of infringement by the owner of the patent monopoly.”) 
(quoting Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d. Cir. 
1930)) (emphasis added). 
 
66 See Kesan & Hayes, 89 IND. L. J. at 289 (“If a patent licensee has a privilege to use the 
licensed patent, this indicates that the licensee has no duty to refrain from using the 







67 Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 35 
U.S.C. § 154). 
 






69 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 721 (1917).  This second article is somewhat of a 
continuation of or sequel to Hohfeld’s first (1913) article on the jural relations, which had 
the same title.   
 
70 Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76 (1900).    
 
71 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 782 n.28. 
 
72 Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720.  See also, id. at 733 (“the attempt to conceive of a right 
in rem as a right against a thing should be abandoned as intrinsically unsound, as 
thoroughly discredited according to good usage, and, finally, as all too likely to confuse 
and mislead”).    
 
73 Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 720.  
 








75 Id. at 723.  
 
76 See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 743 (“the supposed single right in rem correlating with ‘a 
duty’ on ‘all’ persons really involves as many separate and distinct ‘right-duty’ relations 
as there are persons subject to a duty”).  
 
77 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 788; A.M. Honore, Rights of Exclusion and 






78 Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 783-84; Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 
U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920).   
 
79 See Hohfeld, 26 YALE L. J. at 719 (“A’s right against B is a multital right, or right in 
rem, for it is simply one of A’s class of similar, though separate, rights, actual and 
potential, against very many persons.  The same points apply as regards . . . A’s right that 
B shall not manufacture a certain article as to which A has a so-called patent.”). 
 
80 J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“Licenses do not affect all holders of the general 
duty to exclude themselves from the property of others; only those party to the license are 
relieved of the duty.”). 
 
81 Cf., Merrill & Smith, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“[I]f A sells Blackacre to B, this 
does not result in any change in the duties of third parties W, X, Y or Z toward 
Blackacre.  Those duties shift silently from A to B without any requirement that W, X, Y, 







82 See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 743 (“The right to property is a right of exclusion 
which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.”); Merrill & Smith, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. at 787 (“In personam rights attach directly to specific persons, whereas 
in rem rights attach to persons only because of their relationship to a particular ‘thing.’”); 
id. at 783 (“in rem rights . . . attach to persons through their relationship to particular 
things”). 
 
83 See J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 745 (“one is inexorably led into a realm of 
interminable abstract confusion if one regards the ownership of a patent as really the 
ownership of an idea, rather than a monopoly on action whose scope is defined by an 
extremely important expression of what actions are monopolized, i.e., the patent 
specification and claims”). 
 








86 Id. at 1032 (“a licensee with proprietary rights in the patent is generally called an 
‘exclusive’ licensee”).  See also, Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not 
an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in 
Copyright, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. 59, 79 (2013) (“A bare license, however, is nothing 
more than a privilege.”). 
 
87 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  See 
also, Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 90 (explaining that an exclusive license, “is still 
a form of license, however, because the licensor retains a residuum of control over the 
use rights, consisting of the sole power to permit their transfer from one party to 
another.”). 
 
88 Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 934 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. 
Md. 1996). 
 
89 Chan v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16390, *19 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 







90 Dexas Int’l, Ltd. v. Tung Yung Int’l (USA) Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34766, *28 
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia 
S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 





92 Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1370-71. 
 
93 See id. at  1372 n.2. 
 







95 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B. 1583). 
 
96 See CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
THE LAND” 96 (2d ed. 1947); Berger, supra, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 207 (“Spencer’s Case 
established that the burden of a covenant does not run to an assignee unless it ‘touches 






97 Datatreasury, 522 F.3d at 1372-73. 
 
98 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L. J. 885, 894 (2008) 
(“The English courts . . . refused to enforce easements ‘in gross,’ which benefit a person 
or entity without regard to land ownership.”); Newman, 74 LOUISIANA L. REV. at 86 
(“One line of doctrine held that easements were permissible only if made appurtenant to 
an adjacent tenement.”); Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (N.Y. 
1954) (“If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an ‘easement 
in gross’ . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tenements, one dominant, the 
other servient.”). 
 
99 CLARK, REAL COVENANTS, supra, at 96 (“It has been found impossible to state any 
absolute tests to determine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not.”).  
 
100 Cf. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 739 (2007) 
(“extrapolating from real property law to intellectual property law overlooks important 
distinctions between the underlying resources at issue”).  
 
101 Compare Paice, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95042, *32-33 (“licensing terms not tied to 




1368, 1372-73 (“[T]he legal encumbrances deemed to ‘run with the patent’ in these cases 
involved the right to use the patented product, not a duty to arbitrate.  The cases do not 
support a conclusion that procedural terms of a licensing agreement unrelated to the 
actual use of the patent (e.g. an arbitration clause) are binding on subsequent owners of 
the patent.”) (emphases added).   
 
102 Berger, 55 MINN. L. REV. at 222.  
 
103 See Jones v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Tex. App. 14th 1996); 35 
U.S.C. § 261 (“patents shall have the attributes of personal property”); Pressure Sys. Int’l 
v. Airgo IP, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90166, *15 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Agreements 





104 In re Particle Drilling Techs., 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2151, *7 (S.D. Tex. 2009).  
 
105 See COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS at 89; Part I(B), supra; see also, Jeremy 
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The Federal Circuit en banc majority opinion in Lexmark Int’l v. Impression 
Products, included an application of the bundle of sticks conception in the area of patent 
exhaustion.134  The plaintiff, Lexmark, made and sold printers as well as toner cartridges, 
and owned a number of patents covering the cartridges and their use.  The relevant 
cartridges were sold domestically and at a discount but subject to an express single-
use/no-resale restriction.  The defendant, Impression, later acquired the cartridges, not 
directly from Lexmark, but rather after a third party had physically modified them so as 
to enable re-use, in violation of the restriction.  Impression then resold the cartridges, and 
Lexmark sued for patent infringement.  Impression attempted to defend under the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion, arguing that by selling the cartridges, Lexmark had 
																																																								
 
133 Cf. Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 
919 (2016) (“[W]hen I say that patent rights are malleable, I mean that their scope and 
strength can be altered by actors interacting with those rights even after the government 
has issued that right.”). 
 
134 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc), 
certiorari granted (Dec. 2, 2016).  
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exhausted its patent rights in those cartridges and could no longer sue for infringement.  
The en banc majority however found no exhaustion, and in so holding, noted that it “has 
long been a familiar feature of our legal landscape that property rights in a particular 
thing – like the separate interests in making, selling, using, etc., an invention – are viewed 
as a ‘bundle’ of rights (or sticks) that can generally be transferred separately.”135 
The Lexmark dissent, however, was of the view that an authorized sale of a 
patented article exhausts the patentee’s property rights in that article, regardless of any 
contractual conditions placed on the sale.136  The Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari in the case, so it is possible that the dissent’s view might ultimately prevail.  In 
urging the Supreme Court to grant the petition for certiorari, the U.S. Solicitor General 
argued in part that the Federal Circuit majority had been guilty of a “failure to distinguish 
between the rights which are given to the inventor by the patent law and which he may 
assert against the world through an infringement proceeding and rights which he may 
create for himself by private contract.”137   
The distinction drawn by the government is not unlike the distinction between the 
license agreement and its effect on the underlying patent rights, precisely the sort of the 
distinction that Hohfeld’s framework can help to flesh out.138  Normally, a patentee 
																																																								
 
135 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 741. 
 
136 Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“The right to exclude expires (or is 
‘exhausted’) by an authorized sale.”). 
 
137 Impression Prods., Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 15-1189, Brief For The United 
States As Amicus Curiae, at *8 (Oct. 2016) (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917)). 
 
138 See Part I(C), supra.  
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making an unrestricted sale of a patented article would be giving up the Right to exclude 
with respect to that article.  Whoever owns that article has a Privilege (or “authority”) to 
infringe the patent with that article.139  This Privilege would be unaffected by any 
subsequent transfer of the patent, because the patent owner would transfer the bundle of 
patent rights appropriately diminished, including the “No Rights” correlative to the 
Privileges of those who had purchased patented articles from the previous patentee.  But 
according to the Federal Circuit majority in Lexmark, when a patentee explicitly places 
conditions on the sale (e.g., single use, no resale), the patentee is only giving up the Right 
to exclude provided that the article is used in accordance with those conditions.  Thus the 
patent bundle is diminished to a lesser extent than it would be in the case of an 
unrestricted sale of a patented article.   
The question then is whether restrictions placed on an authorized sale should be 
allowed to lessen the extent to which a patentee parts with its in rem patent rights in the 
article sold, or whether such restrictions are mere in personam agreements between the 
buyer and the seller.  One advantage of the bright line rule urged by the Solicitor General 
and by the dissent would be lower information costs on downstream purchasers of 
patented articles.140   
																																																								
 
139 Id. at 734 (“some sales confer authority on the purchaser to take certain actions – such 
as selling or using the purchased article in the United States or importing it into the 
United States – that would otherwise be infringing acts”). 
 
140 See Part I(B), supra.  See also, Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 781 (Dyk J., dissenting) (“Post-
sale restraints would ‘cast a cloud of uncertainty over every sale.’”) (quoting Tessera, Inc. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); Brief For The United 
States, supra, at *14 (“This Court long ago recognized that ‘[t]he inconvenience and 
annoyance to the public’ if patent rights are not exhausted by the first authorized sale are 
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On the other hand, the Lexmark case also seems to raise what J.E. Penner called 
“the question of individuation,” that is, can property be divided any which way (like 
slicing a cake) or is it comprised of certain indivisible base units (like a club is comprised 
of individual people).141  Penner seemed to think that property should be viewed as more 
like the cake.142  The Lexmark majority would allow patentees to control the extent to 
which they part with their patent rights upon sale, whereas the dissent takes more of an 
individuated, all or nothing approach to sales of patented articles. 
B.	 FRAND	Commitments		 Technology	companies	sometimes	seek	to	have	their	patented	inventions	incorporated	into	the	guidelines	promulgated	by	standard	setting	organizations	(SSOs).		In	doing	so,	such	comapanies	promise	that	if	their	invention	is	adopted	into	the	standard,	they	will	license	the	patent	rights	on	fair,	reasonable,	and	non-discriminatory	(FRAND)	terms	to	anyone	who	infringes	due	to	compliance	with	the	standard.		But	what	happens	if	the	company	that	made	the	FRAND	commitment	then	transfers	the	patent?		Is	the	subsequent	patent	owner	bound	by	the	FRAND	commitment?		For	much	the	same	reasons	that	subsequent	patent	owners	are	generally	held	to	be	bound	by	bare	license	commitments,	it	seems	that	the	answer	should	be	yes.		As	Jay	Kesan	and	Carol	Hayes	explain,	“if	a	patentee	could	extinguish																																																																																																																																																																						
‘too obvious to require illustration.’”) (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 
U.S. 659, 667 (1895)).  
 
141 J.E. Penner, 43 UCLA L. REV. at 754.  
 
142 Id. (“If we are to take the bundle of rights analysis of property seriously we have to 
believe that the individual rights are like members of a club . . . .  However, as the 
analysis will show, they are merely like slices of a cake, no more than momentary 
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exchange	sticks	in	the	bundle	for	other	forms	of	value.		When	a	patent	is	transferred,	what	is	transferred	is	whatever	remains	in	the	bundle.		That	is,	the	transferred	patent	is	the	original	bundle	of	sticks	granted	by	the	USPTO,	but	appropriately	diminished	by	the	actions	of	the	previous	patent	owners.			Regarding	the	effect	of	patent	transfer	on	patent	licenses,	the	bundle	theory	provides	a	framework	that	is	more	consistent	and	helpful	than	the	prevalent	encumbrance	theory.		And	although	it	does	not	purport	to	be	the	unifying	theory	of	patent	law,	the	bundle	theory	can	provide	a	useful	way	of	thinking	about	some	other	doctrines	in	patent	law	as	well.		Courts	and	litigators	then,	should	consider	making	use	of	the	bundle	framework,	especially	when	faced	with	issues	arising	from	or	related	to	the	transfer	of	patents.		
